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South Pacific Island Futures:
Paradise" Prosperity" or Pauperism?
R. Gerard Ward
Thirty-two years ago, one midnight in September 1959, I boarded a Qan-
tas 707 jet at Honolulu airport for Nadi, Fiji. It was the second ever com-
mercial jet flight from the United States to the South Pacific Islands and
Australia. Three months later, in the early hours of another morning, at
Nadi Airport, Fiji, I heard the announcer call passengers for a Qantas
plane eastbound to Sydney-via Honolulu, San Francisco, New York,
London, Rome, Cairo, Karachi, Calcutta, Bangkok, Singapore, Darwin,
and Brisbane. The announcer was having fun as he called the first, same
aircraft, round-the-world jet service by any airline. Pan American and
other jets soon followed. New technology had come to transform the rela-
tions of the South Pacific Islands with the rest of the world. The islands
seemed to have arrived in a new age. They were now connected to the rest
of the world by the latest technology. Few noticed that the atoll of Canton
(now Kanton) was about to disappear from airline schedules, to be dis-
connected, as a result of the same technological change. It scarcely mat-
tered, as Canton was populated only by the technical people who main-
tained the airport. It was a time for optimism. Independence was coming.
Agricultural exports were growing. Cocoa would help Samoa and the
Solomons. Coffee was spreading in New Guinea. Samoan banana exports
were at an all-time high. Tourism would supplement the expanding sugar
industry of Fiji. Pineapples, oranges, and bananas would boost the Cook
Islands. New roads were being built. Development was happening, and it
was good.
On 18 April 1991, Canadian International, which, under its earlier
name of Canadian Pacific, had been flying to Fiji, Australia, and New
Zealand for forty-one years, flew its last South Pacific flight. For Cana-
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dian International, the Pacific now ends in Honolulu. Its South Pacific
passengers fly on in Qantas aircraft. No mainland-based North American
airline flies direct to the South Pacific Islands. Apart from a Continental
service from Guam to Papua New Guinea, only Hawaiian Air crosses the
equator to land on a South Pacific island. It is like an internal carrier pro-
viding holiday links between the Samoan and Tongan communities of
Hawai'hmd ealifornia--and-their--homelands-(lslands--Bus-iness--PaG-ifie-,--- -- ----------
June 1991, 23-25). The same advance of technology and scale that
bypassed tiny Canton now threatens to bypass even Fiji-the second larg-
est of the South Pacific states in terms of population.
Since 1959 the islands and peoples of the South Pacific have changed
dramatically, and the social, economic, and political changes are, in large
measure, concomitants of the transport changes. Anyone who tried in
1959 to predict in detail the character of the Pacific Islands of 1991 would
have been rash. For me to try and forecast features of the islands and their
peoples in the next quarter century is equally rash. I shall be selective and
deal mainly with social, economic, and spatial issues. I shall be cautious
and simply outline some of the underlying trends and suggest some of
their implications. I shall say little about strategic issues-a field in which
we are all very aware that predictions are hazardous. But there remain
risks, and the greatest is that of overgeneralization.
The South Pacific Islands are very diverse. The range of scale in popula-
tion, degree of fragmentation, and land area is great. I shall deal mainly
with the islands south of the equator, and leave aside the largest state in
the region, Papua New Guinea, which is so different in scale and resource
base that its problems are of quite a different order and kind to those of
the smaller states. Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, and New Caledonia-
the Melanesian group-have resource potentials far greater than those of
most Polynesian countries. Partly for historical reasons the Solomons and
Vanuatu have much lower levels of literacy than the Polynesian states, a
situation that tends to limit realization of their potential (Figure 1).
Within Polynesia the larger and more compact states of Western Samoa
and Tonga have good soils and considerable agricultural potential, and
populations large enough for some modest industrial activity to be en-
visaged. The atoll countries of Tuvalu and Kiribati have extremely limited
resource bases, major internal transport problems, the highest population
densities, and the fewest options. I emphasize diversity, but there are gen-
eral processes at work. Some countries have been experiencing these pro-
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cesses for longer than others, and one might arrange them in a sequence as
if they are at different stages on the same path. Although it may be helpful
to think in these terms, in reality the processes never work in exactly the
same way in two places. So much for caveats.
The well-worn concept of the South Pacific Islands as a paradise is as
old as the first European incursions into the region. It is exploited in the
tourisrbrochures in- some variant of the-images-ofsun, sea;-and-sand. It
sits uneasily with other images of exotic, mysterious-even "savage" or
"primitive"-islands that are used to attract more adventurous tourists to
parts of Melanesia. To Islanders themselves it is not a real image except in
some fantasy, parallel to Westerners' notions when they hark back wist-
fully to some unreal past, or to some particular element of the past. Para-
dise lost to be regained.
For some, the key to finding "paradise" lay in independence, or control
over their own affairs. Most of the colonial territories of 1959 are now
independent states. First Western Samoa in 1962, then many others
through to the latest in Micronesia, gained independence in a remarkably
peaceful-pacific-manner befitting paradise. But if independence repre-
sents paradise regained, it is a flawed paradise. Nationhood and sover-
eignty are very constrained forms of independence for South Pacific Island
states. Some would argue that independence is close to pauperism with its
extremely heavy dependence on foreign aid. Nevertheless, many of the
material conditions of life have improved for most South Pacific Islanders
over the last thirty years. Whereas in 1959 only urban residents in Western
Samoa had access to piped water and electricity, now 78 and 59 percent
respectively of all agriculturally active households enjoy these services
(WSDS 1990, 41-42). By the measures of our material world-gross domes-
tic product, access to health services, longevity, levels of formal educa-
tion, the volume of consumables in houses, or vehicle ownership-most
Pacific Islanders are better off than they were in 1959. The bases of these
living standards are more problematic, with foreign aid the major source
for infrastructure investment. In the majority of South Pacific Island coun-
tries, receipts from foreign aid exceed the total value of exports. The dic-
tionary defines pauperism as "poverty, with dependence on public relief,
as an established condition or fact among a people" (OED 1971). We might
need to redefine the word for the South Pacific-perhaps "comfort, with
dependence on foreign relief as an established condition." Will the foreign
relief continue to flow to maintain comfort if not prosperity?
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FIGURE 1. Population, literacy rates, aid, and domestic exports. Data from Pacific
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CHANGES IN TRANSPORT
5
In the nineteenth century small trading vessels operating out of Auckland,
Sydney, San Francisco, or Honolulu made landfalls and contact at a multi-
tude of points around island coasts directly from, or en route directly to,
metropolitan ports. Freight rates were generally uniform to all loading
-points.-lJniform eost-of-access-to-many-points-in-an-archipelagowas-the
norm. Colonial governments then established official ports of entry,
reducing the number of islands with direct links to rim countries. The
number of ports of entry in most larger island countries has been reduced
as ship size increased. One or two official ports of entry is now the norm.
Goods for export must first be sent by small vessel to the major port and
there transshipped, making relative costs higher for the residents of outer
islands. Despite government subsidies for freight services, a copra pro-
ducer on an outer island in Fiji must produce 50 percent more copra than
one located on the main island, in order to buy the same basket of goods
(Bayliss-Smith et al 1988). Spatial disadvantage in economic and social life
has increased for large parts of every island country (Figure 2).
In the mid-1950S Fiji, Tonga, Niue, and Samoa had a scheduled passen-
ger liner and freight connection to New Zealand every two weeks. In the
first two of these countries the ships called directly at two ports. The
banana trade of the countries depended on this regularity and frequency
of service. Flying boats provided a supplementary but high-cost passenger
service for some countries. Then came the DC4S and Dc6s. Airfares fell and
airlines captured the passenger trade. Liners ceased to call regularly, and
banana exports collapsed partly as a result. Countries like Niue and the
Cook Islands lacked large airfields and had insufficient demand. Their
external links were largely cut away. In the extreme case, lonely Pitcairn
Island was almost totally isolated when the trans-Pacific liners ceased to
operate. In the 1960s a number of South Pacific islands were less well
served by overseas shipping than they had been in the previous decade.
In the 1970S internal air services began to provide feeder services to
main centers that were financially accessible to some Islanders. But these
air services in turn took passenger traffic from the interisland ships, and
the sequence was repeated as outer islands had fewer freight services. Core
areas of each country, usually the island where the capital stood, were
increasingly advantaged, and other areas disadvantaged.
The process has continued in a variety of forms. Containerization is
ttp ., j'!!;,."""....~
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FIGURE 2. Model of shipping routes from extraregional ports to island
ports, and relative freight costs to island ports, circa 1860 and 1980.
now the norm for ocean services. Large fast container ships offer consider-
able economies of scale, but time in port is costly. Some island countries
require relatively few containers each month, or even each year. It is
scarcely economical for the large vessels to stop. Fortunately there has
been a surplus of container-ship capacity for much of the last fifteen years,
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so such ships have continued to call to drop or pick up a few containers at
island ports on trans-Pacific routes from, say, Japan to New Zealand, or
California to Sydney. They may do so at little more than the marginal cost
of a few hours in port. The Pacific Forum Line, owned by the South
Pacific Island governments, also provides international services from
South Pacific countries to Australia and New Zealand. Once ashore, con-
a-in€fs-must--be--unloaded--andgoods-transferred--to--smalI--vesse1s--£or
onward shipment within the island country. The break of bulk, which
would not affect a large importer located near the port and taking full
container loads, does affect most island importers, particularly those dis-
tant from the major port of entry. Comparative spatial advantage and dis-
advantage are again increased.
For airlines similar principles apply. Wide-bodied and long-range jets
now overfly the island countries to an increasing extent. Mass tourism
bypasses most South Pacific Islands. Smaller and often older aircraft with
higher costs, and hence higher fares per mile, operated the regional and
internal services through the 1980s. The market is often too small for
economies of scale to operate. The tourists, and the economic benefits
they bring, cluster around the capital or in a few accessible enclaves.
LOCATIONAL ADVANTAGE
The increasing differential in locational advantage affects many aspects of
the economy. As agriculture has become reoriented from a subsistence to a
commercial activity and become more dependent on the export of produce
and the import of weedicides, fertilizer, or mechanized equipment, the
reshaping of the geography of locational advantage has become more and
more important in shaping land use patterns and determining what it is
profitable to grow where.
The process has been reinforced by the spread of formal education.
High schools or tertiary institutions are located in the major centers, to
which students must migrate or commute. More recently the establish-
ment of secondary industry, including that encouraged by free-trade zones
or other incentives such as tax holidays, has been concentrated in or close
to the main centers and export gateways. The greater part of the growth
of public service employment, fueled by aid payments, has been in capital
centers.
The natural partner of this spatial polarization has been rural-to-urban
'M!!?!'. uc=m
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migration, whose details differ from country to country. In Rarotonga,
Tahiti, Tongatapu, Tutuila, Upolu, and Efate, commuting and a degree of
on-site urbanization have occurred rather than migration as such. Villages
up to twenty miles from the capital have become suburbanized.
Such internal migration, commuting, and commitment to wage labor
are all age and gender selective, and age structures in rural areas are often
-distorted-inversely to those -of-the-towns-;--¥ill-ages -with-high-d~p(md~ncy:­
ratios are common. With a shortage of men, the burden on women is
often increased, and they take on tasks formerly in the men's domain.
There may be a growing proportion of elderly or very young, sometimes
including pensioners now retired from urban and public service jobs, and
children of urban couples sent back to the village for primary education to
avoid the higher costs of life and education in town at that level. They
mirror the rural children sent to towns for high school education. All rep-
resent dislocated families and social groups, and all, in Kerry James'
words, create "ambiguities ... in the socialization of the children
involved" (1991, 2). What will be the longer term social consequences of
these dislocations? One might hope that education would provide a new
and coherent form of socialization, but to date there is little evidence to
give hope that this will happen.
Relative locational advantage crosses national borders, as do the migra-
tion chains. International migration from the South Pacific Islands is very
obvious in Honolulu. Emigration has kept population increase in island
Polynesia low. Over the intercensal years 1981 to 1986, the population of
Western Samoa increased by only 0.7 percent (WSDS 1986, IS). Since 1980
the populations of the Cook Islands and Niue have declined, and that of
Tonga has increased by less than one percent per year. Only one-third of
ethnic Cook Islanders now live in the Cook Islands; only one quarter of
Niueans are in Niue; almost one quarter of Tongans live in New Zealand,
the United States, or Australia (pers comm, Dr John Connell, 1988). But
people in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands have no easy emigration avenues,
and populations there are increasing at rates higher than 3 percent per
year.
The consequences of emigration are wide ranging. Many Polynesian
families have transnational household economies, blending subsistence
food production on traditionally held land with urban wage labor and the
earnings of, and remittances from, family members in New Zealand or the
United States. Family members and gifts of money, food, or consumer
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goods move back and forth. In the case of Tonga, containerloads of sec-
ondhand goods are shipped from California to relatives in Tongatapu,
there to be sold at local "fairs" (James 1991, 7). In 1989 Western Samoa's
domestic exports were valued at about US$12 million. Remittances (or pri-
vate transfers) totaled almost US$38 million-three times the value of
exports. Aid grants of over US$13 million also exceeded exports.
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
These macroeconomic figures are important clues to the present socioeco-
nomic situation in a number of countries. Where remittances-or wage
labor generated in significant measure by aid grants-offer easier forms of
income than hard agricultural work in the sun, it is not surprising that
agricultural output for export has declined and the sector is generally stag-
nant. Low world prices for copra and other products have contributed.
Decisions made by farmers, or potential farmers, are economically
rational. Except for a few crops, such as taro for export to the Polynesian
populations in New Zealand and the United States, the returns to labor
are unattractive if any alternatives are available. The market for taro is
limited. Wage labor and, for some, remittances provide those alternatives,
but many see their best choice as emigration. In Kiribati, a maritime train-
ing and employment scheme allows more than one thousand I-Kiribati
men to work on German merchant vessels around the world.
Smallholder commercial agriculture is stagnant in much of the South
Pacific, although probably not to the same extent as in parts of Microne-
sia where it seems almost dead. This said, the importance of subsistence
agriculture in Pacific Island economies must not be underestimated. In
Western Samoa about 60 percent of total agricultural production is con-
sumed by the producing households (ADB 1990). In Solomon Islands, Kiri-
bati, and Tuvalu about 75 percent of households are dependent primarily
on subsistence agriculture (pers comm, E. K. Fisk, Nov 1991). Given the
sluggish economies of most of the countries, it has been the subsistence
sector that has maintained basic food supplies and kept people from abso-
lute poverty. However, it cannot provide prosperity in the form of the
consumer goods people desire. Alternative routes to prosperity are few.
In Kiribati and Tuvalu the area of land suitable for agriculture is too
small and the soils too poor for the existing populations to depend on
export agriculture and obtain the level of material welfare to which many
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aspire. Coconuts can only provide a modest income per hectare, and they
are almost the only option for atolls and islands with infrequent shipping
links.
Elsewhere in rural areas the best chance for a renewal of agriculture lies
in a return to more sophisticated agricultural systems. I say "return"
because nineteenth-century food production systems were often very
so1511istiene-d-in use-of-water-control,-terracing, dra-inage,e-r0p-sequen€e-s, - ------
storage, or composting. The disintensification of agriculture in the region
has left an impoverished skeleton. If it is to be restored for the twenty-first
century, it will have to be done through the use of modern methods-good
research, effective extension, new techniques and management, and care-
ful marketing. The potential to develop these methods exists in places
such as the agricultural campus of the University of the South Pacific at
Alafua. It is worrying that the island countries make little use of this
potential. The future lies in education and good application of research.
Yet secondary-level education remains weak in several countries, espe-
cially in Melanesia.
The success of Tongan smallholder cooperatives in exporting squash to
Japan, or in producing and exporting vanilla, shows that particular mar-
ket niches can be established and maintained. So does the revitalized fresh
ginger industry of Fiji in the late 1980s (McGregor 1989). Success requires
strong management in marketing to maintain quality control and regular-
ity of supply. It also requires location close to an airport or export port.
Perhaps prosperity for well-located areas could be attained if these fea-
tures were adopted more widely. Nevertheless, there must be doubts
about whether the level of returns for the majority would be sufficient to
maintain commitment in the face of alternative opportunities.
The most commonly cited advantages of the Pacific Islands are their
exclusive economic zones. Conventional wisdom foresees rich returns
from fishing and seabed minerals. Seabed mining lies in the future, and
how the island states will benefit depends on the international regime
established and their success in negotiating as a group with those possess-
ing the capital and know-how. Island countries are like a school of sar-
dines facing a number of hungry sharks. Like the sardines, if they do not
swim together they will be eaten.
One must be cautious in assessing the potential of fisheries for provid-
ing employment and helping the economies. The United States fishing
industry in the region has not prospered in recent years. Purse seiners have
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been laid up in ports. The Soviet fishing company found that catches in
the Kiribati region did not justify renewal of their fishing agreement at the
price asked by Kiribati. Kiribati's own fishing venture has collapsed. Fiji's
Ika Corporation has had troubled times. The most successful operations
have been those using the waters of the Solomons, Papua New Guinea,
and Vanuatu, where the shallow seas carry more nutrients than the waters
6f-fh:e-wid~1"--a-nd-deep-erPacific-For-these-countries-there-are--fair-pr0s- - ----~--
pects. But the Pacific covers a vast area, and one cannot extrapolate from
one part to another.
The artisanal fisheries of reefs and coastal waters have been the main-
stay of the subsistence and internal market fisheries. Some such fisheries
are under pressure from overexploitation, the destruction of mangroves
which are the breeding areas for some species, and the use of explosives
and weedicides in fishing. Without good fishing statistics one cannot be
certain what is happening to catches, but in Western Samoa new data
from an FAO project show a dramatic fall in catches in the last five years
(pers comm, Dr Leon Zann, Oct I99I).
At present the one area offering prospects for expansion of wage
employment is secondary industry. The case of Fiji since I987 is notable.
The country had a severe economic downturn after the May I987 coup.
Tourists and investors stayed away and more than sixteen thousand peo-
ple fled, including many skilled artisans and professionals. In response,
the interim government introduced trade, tariff, and tax-reform pro-
grams, corporatization of certain government enterprises, and an active
program to attract investment, including very generous tax holidays for
investors. A significant increase in economic growth and paid employ-
ment followed. Tourist numbers rose to precoup levels and above. The
garment industry expanded rapidly, helping to create 38.5 percent more
jobs in manufacturing in I989 than existed in I988 (World Bank I99I,
Table III.2). But the postcoup shortage of skilled personnel remains a
problem.
So successful were some of the clothing manufacturers that by early
I990 Fiji had captured a significant share of the nightwear market in the
United States. The then Fijian opposition leader, Adi Kuini Vuikaba Bava-
dra, described Fiji as "the pyjama republic." Although success led to quota
restrictions by the United States, the lesson from Fiji is that opportunities
do exist for successful manufacturing export industries under certain con-
ditions, including those of market entry, investment security, and wage
rates acceptable to employers.
WARD. SOUTH PACIFIC ISLAND FUTURES 13
..
The importance of this last point was illustrated during the passage of
United States minimum wage legislation in 1991. The tuna cannery firms
threatened that, if American Samoa were not excluded from the proposed
minimum wage rate of $4.25 an hour to be applied in other United States
jurisdictions, they would move operations to some lower-wage location
(North 1991, 54). With few alternative sources of employment, American
-Samoa's-ownrepresentativessupported-the-exdusion-and-h-elp-ed-tb--keep-
wages down. The fact that "most of the workers" are Western Samoan cit-
izens and have no vote in American Samoa (or, as absentees, in Western
Samoa for that matter) was probably a key point (North 1991, 57).
Other countries have moved tentatively toward encouraging export
manufacturing. Tonga has its small industries area, and under the SPAR-
TECA agreement Australia and New Zealand have given easier access to
their markets, albeit subject to conditions governing the proportion of
local content in the goods produced. Only Fiji has taken an aggressively
reformist and export-oriented policy. Recently a plant was opened in
Western Samoa to make simple components for cars made in Australia. It
already employs more than five hundred people, mostly women, and
could become the country's biggest private-sector employer. If successful,
it may show the way for others, and only a few such plants could quickly
reshape the paid employment structure of small island countries. Will this
be the pattern of the future?
IMPACT ON CULTURAL AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS
Migration, wage labor, and the imperative of the factory clock combine,
with greater emphasis on commercial than subsistence agriculture, to
undermine key elements of the so-called traditional social systems. Obvi-
ously the process is not new. It started with the earliest contact with Euro-
peans. Most island societies have not been truly "traditional" for over a
century. Nevertheless, the last thirty years have seen major changes.
Changes in land tenure are particularly important because the systems
for allocating, validating the use of, and transferring the rights to land lie
at the core of South Pacific social systems. They are basic to much of the
political and governmental structure of the region. Yet most island gov-
ernments seem not to have recognized the implications of the changes for
their own power structures.
Studies in which I was involved in the late 1950S in Western Samoa (Far-
rell and Ward 1962; Ward 1962) and Fiji (Ward 1965) indicated that a few
.1...."~"""2""'if"''WI!'3U?OS
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individuals were using communally owned land in markedly individual
ways. They were establishing relatively large holdings. Planting of long-
term tree crops enabled them to retain use rights for much longer periods
than under shifting cultivation. Some employed wage labor rather than
depending on kinship links to mobilize help. Some retained the cash pro-
ceeds within their immediate family instead of sharing them more widely
with kin~and fellow-villagers.-Alongwith-indivicluali-zation- of-tenure-was-a
withdrawal from some or all of the normal customary community obliga-
tions. Those who depended on wage labor for their own farm require-
ments did not want to be distracted from commercial purposes by the
untimely demands of kinship or community obligations.
This trend, which would lead to the emergence of what have been
described as "big peasants" in Asian and African contexts, has a simple
base. Under customary practices in many areas, if one clears land from
forest it remains under one's control as long as it continues to be used. If
abandoned to fallow, it would gradually revert to the common pool, per-
haps to be reused by the same kin group in the future-or perhaps by
another group. In the new context, simply by keeping the land in use, for
example by fencing it for extensive grazing, one could retain authority
over it, and have what might be almost permanent tenure. Traditional
mechanisms were being used for nontraditional purposes.
A number of recent studies show that these processes have accelerated
dramatically. About 20 percent of Fijian farmers now operate as individu-
als outside villages. Large areas of customary land have been cleared for
pasture in eastern Viti Levu where they are now occupied as individual
holdings and grazed at low intensity as if the main purpose were to retain
tenure rather than engage in profitable farming (Ward 1985). In Western
Samoa, it was reported at a Forest Conservation Seminar in May 1991 that
7 percent of the country had been cleared from forest in the previous three
years. Certainly 20 percent has been cleared of forest since the mid-1950S
(WSDEC 1991, 9; Fox and Cumberland 1962, 186). Clearing continues,
although much land closer to roads and villages lies idle. The process
looks like a land grab. People are trying to secure customary land quickly
for long-term family security. Anthropologist Tim O'Meara (1990) has
shown that within Samoan villages a high proportion of land is no longer
farmed under the pule 'authority' of the matai and within the aiga or
extended family organization. Instead, nuclear families are the key units.
Three years ago O'Meara's work was discounted by some leading
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Samoans-that was not the Samoan way, so it did not happen. This year
the government has set up a cabinet committee to examine the whole
question of land tenure. The changes are now too obvious to ignore.
It is now reported to be difficult to get aiga members to work without
cash payment on "plantations" other than those of their own nuclear fami-
lies. The wages expected are close to the government-determined mini-
-mum-wage;-This is--along-way-fromthe-customarypractices·ofja'a-Samotl
and raises doubts about the continued strength of the whole basis of
Samoan social organization.
The processes outlined for Fiji and Samoa have also been noted in
Papua New Guinea (eg, Grossman 1984) and Vanuatu (Rodman 1984). In
Tonga, a revolutionary system of individual holdings that was formalized
in 1882 has come under the pressures of commercialism. There is now
insufficient land to provide the 8% acres to which every adult male is enti-
tled under the constitution. At the same time the attraction of profits from
larger scale farming of watermelons, taro, or squash for export has led to
some farmers obtaining much larger holdings by a variety of means. The
pressure on land for urban purposes has created an informal, and possibly
illegal, land market. Once again a system that was based on equity is help-
ing to create greater variation in wealth and is undermining the social
structure.
The key change in all this has been the removal of the functional links
between the allocation of land, the means of mobilizing labor, and the
social structure. Nayacakalou argued that "there can be no structural
adaptation between social forms whose principles of organisation are con-
tradictory" (1975, 135). The changes in tenure, the individualization of life-
styles, and related processes, mean that the principles under which much
of the economy of the islands now operate are contradictory to those of
the customary society. In those countries with stratified societies, the
sociopolitical hierarchy is now dislocated from its economic base. Can the
society and polity change to keep up? The need to change is not widely or
publicly recognized by politicians, yet changes are being reflected in politi-
cal developments.
The introduction of universal suffrage in Western Samoa in 1991 dem-
onstrates readiness to adjust to the forces of change. The relatively polite
debates in Tonga between the commoner members of Parliament and the
nobles has brought tensions into the open. The coups in Fiji can be inter-
preted as a demonstration of unwillingness to recognize the inexorable
m' m·W'I'!tftl'lIl....FftMfM·'g
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processes resulting from the economic changes the government and the
people have been keen to foster. If that interpretation is correct, then the
words of one leading Fijian politician may be prophetic-"it will take
them [the proponents of the coup] ten years to find out that what they
sought was impossible."
Changes of the type outlined often lead to societal stress. Furthermore,
inmaIiy-pirfts-o{tne wodd;tensib-ns- between ethnicgroups-have-become-
common. The relative homogeneity of the Polynesian countries has lim-
ited such internal divisions, except where communities from different
Polynesian countries now live side by side. Outbreaks of violence have
occurred between island communities in New Zealand.
The situation in western Melanesia is different. Here, lack of larger
political groupings in largely unstratified societies; linguistic diversity; and
the small size of the individual precontact communities that regularly
interacted through trade, marriage, or political linkages, have all contrib-
uted to unstable social and political situations. People with no kinship,
linguistic, or sociopolitical ties or moral cohesion as groups, are thrown
together in urban areas. Groups may feel that their government is domi-
nated by strangers, if not outright traditional enemies. Many have little
sense of identity with the state. The difficulties of creating such an iden-
tity, and the whole new suite of social responsibilities toward strangers
across great cultural diversity and social distance must be one of the
southwest Pacific's greatest dilemmas. I'm not sure that anyone, there or
anywhere in the world, has an answer.
It is not surprising that ethnic, or tribal, unrest has emerged as a grow-
ing problem in the postcolonial era. It was of course present in the colo-
nial period but the external power held a real power dominance and
could, and often did, put down unrest. Furthermore, the pax Britannica,
or pax Australiana had temporary advantages not shared by independent
governments. Colonial governments were not answerable to voters. By
their very foreignness, mystery, and little-understood power and material
wealth, they enjoyed for a time an almost supernatural aura. Indepen-
dence did not see this aura transferred to the new administrations. Fur-
thermore, the imposition of peace between groups by external power tem-
porarily reduced some of the main causes of conflicts. Land situated
within the dangerous marchlands between tribal groups had often lain
idle. With local warfare banned, it became safer to move into these areas
and alleviate population pressure. A key cause of tribal conflict was
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removed, or reduced for two or three decades. Population pressure later
reemerged, both directly because of population growth, and indirectly
because of the demand for Western goods that motivated people to plant
increasing areas in cash crops. The vacant frontier lands had often been
occupied by the time of independence. Traditional rivals were now face to
face across much narrower frontier zones.
ransport--also-paved the-way for-tensions~-New-roa-dS-alfd--airfielas-
gave access for commercial agriculture, but also provided the routes by
which contacts with strangers and enemies were extended. The human
and fragile qualities of the rulers and government power were revealed.
Without the introduction of a new sense of national identity or civic
responsibility toward people other than one's own kin or wantok group,
the situation is ripe for intergroup strife.
The last few years have seen the dangers realized. The people of
Bougainville feel a strong sense of ethnic difference to the "redskins" of the
rest of Papua New Guinea, and some feel they have been unfairly treated
by both colonial and postindependence governments. Attempted seces-
sion, a three-year crisis, great suffering, and economic hardship for both
the Bougainvilleans and other Papua New Guineans have resulted, with
many deaths in clashes between the army and Bougainvilleans.
Similar tensions exist elsewhere in Melanesia, though fortunately none
has erupted into similar levels of bloodshed and suffering. The potential
remains. Jimmy Stephens, who led the rebellion on Espiritu Santo against
the newly independent government of Vanuatu in 1980, and who was
released from jail in 1991, was reported in November 1991 as saying he
was returning to Santo to take up the cause again. Others in Vanuatu
remain in uneasy allegiance to the state.
In Solomon Islands, tension between people from different islands
sometimes flares. The people of Guadalcanal and the Western Province
resist migration to their islands by people from Malaita and elsewhere.
The complex systems of provincial and national governments in both
Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands reflect the ethnic realities and
complexities of the countries. They aimed to decentralize decision making
but have not proved very efficient either in governing or in creating a sta-
ble polity.
The years of unrest in New Caledonia prior to the Matignon Accord
included important ethnic elements. The Melanesian Kanaks are outnum-
bered by the combined population of Europeans and Polynesian migrants
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from Tahiti and Wallis and Futuna; together, these three elements make a
volatile mix.
There can be little doubt that Melanesia will remain socially unstable
for years to come. Recently the fragmentation of states along ethnic lines
has almost become respectable after four decades in which it was anath-
ema in the former colonial world. Perhaps there could be as many as eight
states in Melanesia-bythe end-ohhe-century.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Changes in transport technology have reshaped the locational geography
of the region, disadvantaging many islands. Agricultural economies have
stagnated and will only be revived if much higher levels of organizational
skill are applied. Aid has fueled wage employment and urbanization and
drawn people away from the disadvantaged areas. But aspirations are not
fully met in the islands, and those people who have the opportunity fre-
quently migrate to metropolitan countries. Sociopolitical structures are
being undermined by the forces of socioeconomic change. Islanders'life-
styles in both the home islands and the rim countries are evolving quickly,
but at different rates. The change is away from custom, toward a con-
sumer and commercial society, and toward a different form of pauperism
-one in which dependence on foreign cultures becomes an established
condition. To keep pace with the material wants of individuals and their
nuclear families, and to retain the valued elements of island culture, is a
major intellectual challenge. It requires the tools of the new world-edu-
cation of quality; books and libraries; research and its application; under-
standing, not only of traditional folkways, but of how to use knowledge
drawn from the whole span of human experience to preserve the core, and
the best, of island cultures for active use in the twenty-first century.
If the smaller South Pacific Island cultures are to be viable entities, their
survival may be as dependent on former Islanders who live in Pacific rim
countries as on those who remain in the islands. Those living in the rim
countries have much better access to the necessary tools. But long-term
cultural viability may also be problematic for larger Polynesian and
Melanesian communities. For example, will those who, in New Zealand,
Once Were Warriors, to borrow the title of Alan Duff's powerful novel, be
able in sufficient numbers to recapture the key features of Maori society,
blend them with what is essential for twenty-first century existence,
WARD. SOUTH PACIFIC ISLAND FUTURES
and turn them into something of strength and value to all of that coun-
try's people? Will this happen for Samoans, Tongans, Cook Islanders,
Niueans, or Micronesians whether they live in the islands or in New
Zealand or the United States? Will they retain a real island identity? Or
will the island cultures wither and stagnate? Will remaining Solomon
Island and Vanuatu cultures survive simply because there is no migration
outlet?
Duff, in an Australian Broadcasting Corporation radio interview about
his book, stressed the need to take on and effectively use the power of edu-
cation and literacy to enrich Maori culture through self-help, and thereby
permit Maori people to participate fully in the broader society, but from a
strong and respected stance as Maori. If they and the other Pacific Island
peoples do not, then his biting comment may prove sadly prophetic for the
South Pacific Islands-"If you have a peasant culture, you will have a
peasant outcome."
In my view, "peasant outcomes" will not satisfy the majority of Pacific
Islanders beyond another generation. The biggest dilemma may then stem
from the fact that a large number of South Pacific Islands will not support
more than a peasant outcome in resource, locational, or economic terms.
It seems almost inevitable that the flows of migrants will continue as indi-
viduals and families make their choices about where their material, and
perhaps social, welfare can best be found. They may choose material
prosperity elsewhere, rather than accept an image of paradise or a form of
aid-dependent pauperism within their home islands.
::. ::. ::.
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Abstract
Technical changes in air and sea transport since the 1950S have had differential
effects within the Pacific Islands region. Many islands are now disadvantaged in
relation to a few main centers and core areas. Social, political, and economic
changes have occurred, in part as concomitants of transport changes. New pat-
terns of locational advantage for agricultural and commercial activity, education,
and aid dependence have fostered internal and international migration, which has
been accompanied by considerable social disruption.
Overall economic prospects are limited, but the possibilities for niche manu-
facturing for export are demonstrated by recent Fijian and Samoan experience.
Economic and spatial changes have led to modification of de facto land tenure
and labor arrangements that may undermine the bases of sociopolitical systems.
The implications for indigenous cultures tend to be overlooked by politicians and
customary leaders. Education and modern intellectual tools have not been used
effectively to understand the cultural changes or to strengthen the viable compo-
nents of customary ways. Unless this occurs, emigration and the weakening of
island cultures may continue, and a form of aid-dependent pauperism may
become entrenched.
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